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Risk and Risk Management 
Basic Concepts
Keith J. Crocker
University of Michigan Business School
“This has got to be the worst day of my life,” observed William
Clay Ford Jr., Ford Motor Company Chairman, as he contemplated the
February 1999 natural gas explosion in boiler number six that had just
leveled part of the River Rouge powerhouse in Detroit, Michigan. The
disaster killed 6 people and seriously injured 14, and cut off power to
the 1,100 acre facility.
While Ford Jr.’s remarks were directed toward the human dimen-
sion of the tragedy, from a corporate standpoint the prognosis must
have appeared equally sobering. The Rouge complex powerhouse—the
centerpiece of Henry Ford’s dream of building entire cars in a single
location—had supplied electricity, compressed air, mill water, and
steam to six assembly and parts plants employing 10,000 workers, and
also to the independently owned Rouge Steel plant. Although an engi-
neering marvel of its time, the concentration of production at River
Rouge had precipitated a risk manager’s worst nightmare, as the effects
of the integrated plant’s shutdown rippled through Ford’s internal sup-
ply network.
First hit was Rouge’s own Mustang assembly plant, which had
been working overtime with two 10-hour shifts daily cranking out the
popular sports compact. Next came Rouge’s metal stamping plant, sup-
plying metal parts (fenders and similar products) to 16 of Ford’s 20
North American plants. Results were predictable. Shifts were cut from
8 hours to 4 hours at three Midwest assembly plants, and lost produc-
tion at Rouge’s frame plant resulted in the elimination of scheduled
overtime at truck plants in Kansas City, Missouri; Norfolk, Virginia;
and Oakville, Ontario.
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Even at these reduced levels, production was supported only by the
buffers of existing inventories and supplies in transit that, once
exhausted, would necessitate plant shutdowns. And a previously
planned $240 million replacement powerhouse would not be com-
pleted for at least a year (Financial Times 1999).
Risk is endemic to our personal, as well as professional, experi-
ences. Every time we decide to cross the street or ascend the stairs in
our homes, we are making personal decisions involving risks and their
management. How we handle these situations has an important impact
on the quality (and, in many cases, the length!) of our lives.
WHAT IS RISK?
Webster’s dictionary defines risk as “the chance of injury, damage,
or loss.” Unlike, say, a portfolio of stocks, which has a potential for
gain, risks present only a down side. A risk is a chance of something
bad occurring and, hence, to be avoided. Of course, even bad things
can provide a profit opportunity to somebody—the city taxes me to
haul away my garbage, thereby providing employment, and the “Orkin
Man” is happy to fumigate my house, for a fee. But I do not generally
bring home extra garbage or encourage termites to infest my house.
Nor do sensible people seek out risk. However, risk can be managed.
This chapter lays out the key elements of risk management: identifica-
tion and quantification, mitigation and control, financing, and catastro-
phe planning.
IDENTIFICATION AND QUANTIFICATION
Given that risks are endemic in our uncertain world, adopting
appropriate strategies to deal with risk exposures and their conse-
quences is an everyday task. Consider the case of the pedestrian con-
templating crossing a busy street. The first step is to identify the risk
(speeding automobiles with distracted drivers chatting on cell phones?)
and to quantify its magnitude (scrapes? bruises? broken bones? fatali-
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ties?). This mundane task is the critical point of departure for one craft-
ing a risk management strategy—remember the old aphorism that
“forewarned is forearmed,” which is probably the best piece of cheap
advice that a risk manager can give.1
In the business setting, many kinds of risk are identifiable, even to
the most uninitiated. Dangerous machinery or exposed electrical wir-
ing in a factory setting, or slippery floors in an office or retail establish-
ment (squashed grapes on the floor are a grocer’s nightmare) are
obvious examples. Other types of risk exposures may be less apparent
and discernible only to those with experience in a particular area of risk
analysis. Much as standing under a tree during a thunderstorm may
seem reasonable to those unfamiliar with lightning, risk exposures may
not be apparent to an untrained eye. 
In the case of the Ford Rouge power plant, for example, there were
certainly engineering advantages associated with the consolidation of
production of the electricity, steam, and high-pressure air required by
the entire Rouge complex. But the risks of this approach also turned
out to be substantial, as the events of February 1999 attest.
Perhaps the most insidious risks facing businesses these days,
however, come from evolving legal rules, as we have observed in the
case of environmental liability and asbestos exposure. The Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, the
1980 Superfund hazardous substance clean-up legislation, introduced
strict liability that may involve several entities jointly for cleaning up
hazardous waste sites. As a consequence of this new legal reality, a
business could have been in full compliance with all applicable laws at
the time of the waste disposal, or simply be the current owner of an
existing site, yet still be strictly liable for the costs of clean-up. Even
partial contributors to the site are fully liable for the entire cost of
clean-up, due to joint and several liability,2 leading to the predictable
prospecting for “deep pockets” by enterprising tort attorneys. These
liabilities also may be inherited, which makes mergers and acquisitions
problematic these days.
Asbestos exposure also provides an instructive example. Fifty
years ago, most people had little understanding of the health risks asso-
ciated with airborne asbestos fibers in the workplace, and exposure
standards reflected this. Over time, however, it became increasingly
clear that asbestosis (a close cousin of the black lung disease suffered
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by coal miners) and mesothelioma (an untreatable cancer of the lung or
stomach lining that is both swift and invariably fatal) were associated
with workplace exposures. The result has been an explosion of litiga-
tion (estimated potential: 1.3 to 3.1 million claims) with expected
asbestos liabilities of $200 billion, of which $78 billion will be borne
by the affected companies and the rest by their insurers (Parloff 2002).
Litigation has already destroyed the primary producers of asbes-
tos—Johns-Manville, Unarco, and Raybestos Manhattan all declared
bankruptcy long ago—and has moved on to bankrupt companies that
merely purchased asbestos products, including Babcock & Wilcox,
Owens Corning, GAF, and W.R. Grace. Currently in the crosshair of
asbestos litigation are Georgia-Pacific (involving gypsum products),
3M (for allegedly failing to warn that the dust masks wouldn’t work if
improperly used), and Ford (for exposures related to the asbestos used
in brakes). Federal-Mogul Corp., an automotive supplier, recently
sought Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection because of an asbestos liabil-
ity inherited from its 1998 acquisition of T&N PLC of Manchester,
England, a company that had used asbestos in a separate building sup-
plies business. At the time of the acquisition, Federal-Mogul set aside
$2.1 billion in cash to cover the anticipated claims, a sum that in retro-
spect seems to have been nowhere near enough.
Daniel S. Sobczynki, the former Director of Corporate Insurance
for Ford, put it best: “The highest potential risks are those that are uni-
dentified and unmanaged. It is critical to evaluate your risks and to
learn from the lessons of others,” he says. “The problem of learning
from personal experience is that it gives you the lesson after the test
has been administered” (Financial Times 1999).
MITIGATION AND CONTROL
After the risk exposure has been assessed, the next step is to con-
sider how one deals with it. Continuing with our street-crossing exam-
ple, one possibility would be to avoid the risk entirely and not cross the
street at all (a wise strategy if the road in question were, say, Interstate
94 at rush hour). Alternatively, if we decide to proceed, the question
might be the following: do we jaywalk and cross the street now, or
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stroll down to the traffic signal and wait for the green light? Each of
these alternatives represents an economic decision, weighing the cost
of the strategy against the potential benefits.
Generically, mitigating a risk exposure entails the identification of
tactics either to reduce the probability of a bad outcome, or to reduce
the magnitude of a loss, should a bad outcome occur. The former types
of activities, referred to as loss prevention measures, would include the
cross-at-the-intersection option discussed above, or, in a more mun-
dane industrial setting, the inspection of electrical wiring to reduce the
probability of an electrical fire. Indeed, most of the risk mitigation
strategies that come easily to mind are designed to keep us out of trou-
ble in the first place—don’t put the gasoline can next to the furnace,
don’t smoke in bed, lock your doors before you retire for the night.
Loss reduction, on the other hand, describes the class of risk mitigation
activities designed to reduce the magnitude of a loss, should one occur.
The standard example here would be the installation of sprinklers in a
warehouse, which doesn’t reduce the probability of a fire starting but,
rather, mitigates the damages that result from the fire.
The explosion of boiler number six at the River Rouge powerhouse
occurred during a maintenance shutdown. As far as can be determined,
a valve unintentionally left open allowed natural gas to flow into the
boiler, which was quickly ignited by the electrostatic scrubbers located
in the boiler’s chimney. 
In retrospect, it appears that the tragedy stemmed from a lack of
attention paid to issues of risk mitigation during routine episodes of
maintenance. Not only was the act of shutting down the boilers rare,
but apparently there were no written procedures or checklists to guide
the process. Employees who had not been trained in shutting off the
boilers and who had last received an equipment manual in 1997, had to
shut off over 30 (unlabeled) natural gas valves throughout the power-
house complex. They missed one, and the rest is history.
We make trade-offs in our personal and business lives between the
burden of risk exposure and the cost of risk mitigation. Financing the
costs associated with a bad outcome becomes the question. In personal
settings, the risk financing strategy generally adopted is that of risk
shifting to a third party, usually an insurance company (think about the
collision and liability insurance on your car, homeowner’s insurance,
or the warranty on a new appliance). The problem with this type of risk
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transfer, though, is that it creates what is known in economics as a
“moral hazard.”
A colleague of mine kept a sailboat moored off the end of his dock
on Long Island Sound. One day, during casual conversation, I asked
about his strategy for dealing with storms and the like—as a boat
owner myself, I was aware (risk identification and quantification) of
the effects of heavy wave action on a boat banging against a dock. He
responded that he wasn’t worried because he had insurance and he
never took the boat out of the water until the end of the season. The
problem here, of course, is that if one is fully insured against a loss,
then one has no incentive to take (privately costly) actions to reduce
one’s risk exposure. Insurance companies, not surprisingly, have fig-
ured this out.
When my teen-aged son finally made enough money to purchase a
car, it turned out that the machine of his dreams was a 1994 Camaro
Z28, with a 5.7 liter V-8 engine and 270 horsepower. You might think
that no insurer in their right mind would write coverage in a situation
like this, but you would be wrong. An automobile insurer in Michigan
was willing to provide liability coverage at a finite premium. But, there
was a catch—no coverage for collision damage.3 Effectively, he has a
100 percent deductible if he wraps the car around a tree. 
This retained risk has “incentivized” my son to drive carefully.
This is generally the trade-off that you will find in your personal and
professional risk financing decisions—increased investment in risk
elimination reduces the premiums you pay per dollar of coverage, but
the down side is that you are exposed to more risk.
CATASTROPHE PLANNING
Accidents do happen despite the best intentions and most effective
efforts to forestall such eventualities. And the response to the bad news
is probably the most critical component of any loss reduction strategy.
In the immediate aftermath of the Rouge River powerhouse catas-
trophe, William Clay Ford Jr. dispatched his personal aide, with credit
card in hand, to track down the victims’ families and do whatever was
required to help out. The company worked with its suppliers to procure
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electrical switching equipment and to obtain portable boilers for steam.
Detroit Edison built an outdoor substation—in a week—to supply the
power necessary to get the Rouge River complex back on line. The
result was a triumph in loss reduction—a potentially catastrophic busi-
ness interruption scenario truncated to a one-week hiccup on the pro-
duction line.
There are many other examples of the importance of catastrophe
planning, good and bad. For example, back in 1986, when a still uni-
dentified individual replaced the painkiller in several bottles of Tylenol
capsules with cyanide, the result was the death of an innocent con-
sumer. Johnson & Johnson, the maker of Tylenol, didn’t attempt to
deflect blame (after all, they hadn’t adulterated the capsules) or other-
wise temporize. They immediately recalled all the capsules from store
shelves—even those that were clearly untainted—and then designed
the generation of tamper-proof containers still in use today. This is a
textbook loss-reduction strategy—timely, aggressive, and (while costly
in the short run) effective.
In contrast, consider the strategy of Johns-Manville, once the
world’s biggest producer of asbestos, which, as we noted earlier, col-
lapsed under the weight of litigation from asbestos claims in 1982.
Johns-Manville’s apparent decision to ignore the risks of asbestos
exposure to its workers, long after the evidence indicated that manage-
ment may have suspected a link between asbestos exposures in the
workplace and worker health, resulted in lives ruined and lost. The cost
to Manville and its shareholders was ultimately that of corporate bank-
ruptcy. 
Dan Sobczynski offers some sound advice: “Either manage the
risk, or it will manage you,” he says, “and, when it does, the loss will
happen when you are least prepared” (Financial Times 1999).
Notes
1. Students of history will recall that Winston Churchill was almost killed by a
speeding taxi in New York City during the 1930s. Accustomed to cars driving on
the left side of the road, he looked the wrong way while crossing the street, a clear
failure in risk identification and quantification.
2. Joint and several liability means, in practice, that even a 1 percent ownership
stake in the property can lead to liability for 100 percent of the clean-up costs if
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the owners of the other 99 percent interest are financially unable to pay their
share.
3. Actually, they would provide such coverage, but at an annual premium effectively
equal to the book value of the car!
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